Expert Explains | US says Iran talks to continue tomorrow: In one week since last round, what has changed?

The first is the historic political issue of US objections to Iran's nuclear programme, an approximately 30-year-old dispute that has featured in recurring, usually indirect, negotiations between Washington and Tehran.

The second is the more recent military issue of the US/Israeli war on Iran that began on February 28, and is now centred around Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz .

Given that this new character of the Strait is a direct product of the war, the US looks to discuss it as part of the current ceasefire, and distinct from the nuclear issue. Functionally, this would mean Iran opens the Strait in return for the US extending the ceasefire, and this enables negotiations for a broader political agreement — another nuclear deal.

For Iran, control of Hormuz is not a presumed temporary aspect. Iran now looks to use its Hormuz leverage to force a dilution of US demands and gain concessions across the board. This includes US guarantees against further attacks, unfreezing of Iranian assets, sanctions relief, and recognition of US rights to Iranian enrichment, among others.

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This stark divergence is arguably why the April 11 Islamabad Talks yielded no outcome.

Fresh challenges

For Iran, extension of this ceasefire consistently included the need for Israel to stop attacking Lebanon, in return for opening the Strait (with continuing Iranian regulation), something Israel had stridently opposed. However, ceasefire in Lebanon was announced last week, with Trump even saying in a social media post, "Israel will not be bombing Lebanon any longer. They are PROHIBITED from doing so by the USA".

While Trump also explicitly de-linked the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire from the US-Iran talks, it is evident that Washington in effect is pressurising Israel to not bomb the negotiation efforts.

Whether that leads to peace and stability is a different question. The issues of disarming Hezbollah or Israel's continued occupation of key Lebanese towns remain unaddressed. While Lebanon and Israel are conducting negotiations of their own, there is a very thin likelihood they will generate viable outcomes.

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The possibility of disarming Hezbollah was considerably thin even in September last year, when the Lebanese government announced its commitment to do so. Now, with Iran's ability to provide a Hormuz-linked cover to Hezbollah, such disarmament is more unlikely. This leaves Israel in an untenable position.

Even if Israel acquiesces in the short term (long enough for the US to extricate itself from this quagmire), Washington itself has created new conditions through a US naval blockade of Iranian ports, which has disrupted but not halted Iranian oil shipping). This has caused Iran to make Hormuz's reopening further contingent on the US lifting this secondary blockade. On April 18 and 19, the IRGC Navy prevented both India and China-bound ships from transiting the Strait, with the former also facing gunfire.

Misreading signals

While both the United States and Iran ultimately desire a negotiated outcome, their determination to exit the war with some level of dominance over the other is creating a new escalation trap.

From Tehran's perspective, even if it is willing to concede the same unprecedented nuclear programme concessions to Washington as it did before the war, it cannot leave the table without securing a long-term insurance policy.

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From Washington's perspective, not only must Iran not be allowed such insurance (which will also dent American deterrence) but must also appear to have ceded to immediate US-imposed terms.

There is the added problem of the US President seemingly misreading Iranian signals for negotiations by posting possible Iranian offers on social media. This forced Iran to further entrench hardline positions, and was evident on April 17/18.

At 6:15pm IST, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced the opening of the Strait to all commercial shipping in line with the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire, but along the new "coordinated" route that Iran had created. Notwithstanding Iranian expectations of the US lifting its blockade in return (even if sold as a US victory), at 6:57pm IST Trump posted that Iran had declared the Strait to be "fully open and ready for business and full passage". Crucially, Trump added, "but the naval blockade will remain in full force…until such time as our transaction with Iran is 100% complete."

Washington missing the off-ramp caused Tehran to harden, not dilute, its position. By 3:44am on April 18, Iranian Parliament Speaker MB Ghalibaf announced that "with the continuation of the blockade, the Strait of Hormuz will not remain open". Since then, the IRGC has reiterated Hormuz's closure, the off-ramp offered through Araghchi has been abandoned, and all Iranian actors are closing ranks around the hardline position of linking the current ceasefire talks with nuclear programme outcomes, removing the de-linking chance that the Lebanon ceasefire had offered.

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Given the new US blockade, Iran's entrenchment of its own blockade, and Israel's shaky acquiescence to the Lebanon ceasefire, there are enough variables threatening the talks. Still, the fundamental truth that the Strait cannot be opened through the quick application of military force remains true.

Even the new UK-France led European coalition (without the US) being mounted for Hormuz shipping is characterised as a "post-war" coalition, potentially mimicking the successful anti-piracy coalition that operated off the Horn of Africa across the 2010s.

Ultimately, the Iranian effort remains to prevent Washington from viewing the ceasefire objectives as 'terms of Iranian surrender' and to ensure equitable nuclear negotiations, which are still possible. The next round of talks in Islamabad should show how well Washington has or has not perceived Iran's position and its needs.

Bashir Ali Abbas is Senior Research Associate, Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi